Xiang Yin (尹 翔)

Welcome! I am a PhD candidate in Finance at the London School of Economics. I am on the 2021/2022 academic job market.

Research interests:

  • Entrepreneurial Economics

  • Venture Capital and Private Equity

  • Public Spending and Finance

  • Big Data in Government

Email: x.yin5 [at] lse.ac.uk

Curriculum Vitae (updated 11/2021)

Working Papers:

To spur the growth and investment of small businesses, local governments give preferential treatment to local suppliers in their purchases. Given that, I examine if sales to the local government result in more corporate investment than sales to nonlocal governments. I construct a novel and granular data set of the purchases of 308 councils in England with corporate suppliers in monthly frequency from 2011 to 2020. First, I document that compared to non-local boards, suppliers receive more specialised contracts from the local council and maintain a more persistent customer-supplier relationship with it. Next, to identify the causal relationship between local sales and suppliers’ outcomes, I exploit exogenous demand shocks with spatial fixed effects on the councils’ boundaries. I find that local sales reduce the uncertainty of firms’ cash flows while keeping expected cash flows unchanged. It implies that the customer-supplier relationship with the local council is not just more persistent but also more exclusive. Consequently, I find local sales result in 9.7% higher annual growth in fixed assets than sales to non-local sales. The results suggest that the uncertainty in cash flows, one underexplored channel, helps explain government purchases’ impacts on suppliers. Overall, this paper highlights some novel patterns of governments’ purchases and their effects on firms’ growth and investment.

Distribution of Spending Near the Boundaries of Councils

We study the venture performance effects of Venture Capital (VC) due diligence—i.e., the process through which VCs scrutinize ventures for potential investment. Our novel data comprises nearly 2,000 startups applying for funding to a UK VC seed fund (Fund). For identification, we exploit the Fund's process of screening applicants for due diligence, which features pre-determined selection rules based on the scores of randomly allocated reviewers. We show that assignment to due diligence leads to substantial increases in venture capital fundraising and growth within two years of application, even for those firms that receive no eventual investment from the Fund. The due-diligence performance effects do not vary systematically across observable or unobservable applicant characteristics. By contrast, we find little evidence of venture performance effects from applicants' assignments to informal Fund meetings that are not part of the due diligence process. The results provide evidence that going through VCs' due diligence process adds value in the form of improved venture performance through three potential mechanisms: certification, coaching and self-validation. This new evidence implies that VCs' role in innovation affects many more firms, as it goes beyond their value-added effects on portfolio companies in which they invest. Therefore, frictions in the process through which startups seek and obtain VC due diligence can profoundly impact innovation and economic growth.

The Selection Funnel of A UK VC Firm

Work in Progress:

  • Competing for Connections: Evidence from Municipal Bonds Auctions

How do financial institutions build connections with local governments? I find that in competitive auctions of municipal bonds issuance, buyers offer lower yields to initiate private relationships with local governments. The lower the yield is in competitive auctions, the more likely the issuer will switch to negotiations with the winner in the follow-up issuances. The effects are pronounced for non-bank institutions during the issuances of revenue bonds where they have expertise and information advantage.

Bank Qualification and the Auction-Negotiation Spread (Bank-qualified Issuance: Principal ≤ $10M )

  • Bureaucratic Efficiency and Housing Markets

Does bureaucracy have real impacts on economic activities? I provide micro evidence from the housing market in London. I focus on a single-dimension and verifiable task of bureaucrats—the permission for plans of new buildings or house renovations (it takes a median applicant 56 days to obtain the permission). Using a hand-collected dataset of over 1.8 million planning applications from 2001 to 2020, I find the ineffectiveness of processing these applications reduces price volatility in general. For identification, I exploit the variations in bureaucratic effectiveness at the local authority level. While the market friction posed by the government's inefficiency has a modest impact on aggregate trading volume, it stabilizes the market price in times of extensive speculative trading.

Negative Correlation between Bureaucratic Inefficiency and Price Volatility in Housing Market

  • The Transmission of Deposit Shocks Via Small Banks

With Jing Wen (CityU HK) and Christian Simon Paparcuri (CityU HK)

  • The Impacts of Media Coverage on Venture Capital Markets,

With Yue Fei (UNC Chapel Hill)